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Abstract 
Good Corporate Governance in the company also related with social responsibility, where good disclosure of 
social responsibility shows that the company has done good corporate governance. This study aims to determine 
the effect of Good Corporate Governance which proxies the size of board of commissioners, independent 
commissioners, and institutional ownership, also profitability, leverage, toward the disclosure of Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Population in this research is food and beverage company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange year 
2014-2016. The sample of research is 51. The method of research analysis using multiple linear regression analysis. 
The results show that independent commissioners have a positive and significant influence and institutional 
ownership has a negative and significant impact on the disclosure of corporate social responsibility.  
Keywords: Good Corporate Governance, Profitability, Leverage, Corporate Social Responsibility. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Industry in Indonesia is now growing in line with technological advances, characterized by innovations in the 
industry, especially food and beverage industries sprang up flavor variants. Curiosity and public interest in a 
product for a producing company or distributor is very useful and profitable for the company. In order for the 
company to survive, the company must have good governance and disclosure of social responsibility.  
Corporate social responsibility is an idea that makes the company is no longer faced with the responsibility 
that stands on the single bottom line, where the value of the company (corporate value) is reflected in the financial 
condition (financial) only. But the responsibility of the company must stand on the triple bottom line that is also 
concerned with social and environmental issues, Daniri (2008), Nurkhin (2011).  
Although social responsibility is a program recommended by the government and there is a legal protection, 
but not all companies can do it, it can be caused by various factors. 
Environmental management, labor practices, occupational safety, occupational health, social and community 
development, product responsibility, are among the points in the company's annual report on social responsibility. 
Although there are still companies whose annual report has not yet disclosed in detail the social responsibilities it 
undertakes, the company only discloses its social responsibility with one of the only points of social and 
community development, the company improving the channel and providing clean water for the citizens. In fact, 
if the company expressed its social responsibility, it can broadly provide a positive value for the company in the 
eyes of investors. But it all depends on the ability of the company in performing its own social responsibility, 
where social responsibility is mandatory for companies in their activities using natural resources, such as food and 
beverage companies whose products are vegetable oils, snacks which are tubers, companies that produce flour, or 
any company whose products come from the sea.  
The ability of companies in social responsibility may be seen from the profitability where the profits earned 
by the company over a certain period may affect the relationship of social responsibility or not, and can also be 
seen on leverage, whether the debt or liabilities owned by the company can affect the relationship of social 
responsibility or not. Sembiring (2005), Nurkhin (2010), and Yuliawati (2015) in research related to profitability 
of Sembiring (2005) found no relation between those variables, unlike Nurkhin (2010) ) and Yuliawati (2015) who 
found a positive relationship on the variable. The relationship between leverage and disclosure of social 
responsibility shows consistent results. Sembiring's research (2005), Anggraini (2006), Cahyaningsih (2011), 
Sudana (2011), and Yuliawati (2015) found the same result that is a negative relationship between these variables.  
Good corporate governance in the company also has a relationship with social responsibility, where good 
disclosure of social responsibility shows that the company has done good corporate governance. Darwin (2007) 
Novita and Djakman (2008) state that the disclosure of environmental, social, and economic performance in the 
annual report or separate report is to reflect the degree of accountability, responsibility, and corporate transparency 
to investors and other stakeholders Nurkhin (2010).  
Accountability, responsibility and transparency are one of the principles of corporate governance, which are 
known to be 5 principles: transparency, accountability, responsibility, independence, and equality. Murwaningsih 
(2009) social responsibility has a close relationship with good corporate governance, as both sides of the currency 
both have a strong position in the business world but are in touch with each other. The social responsibility is 
oriented towards the stakeholders, this is in line with the main principles of good corporate governance that is 
responsibility, while disclosure of the implementation of corporate social responsibility in line with the principle 
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of transparency.  
Various researchers conducted research on the relationship of disclosure of social responsibility with good 
corporate governance, in this study good corporate governance is proxied by the size of the board of commissioners, 
independent commissioners, and institutional ownership. Different results that researchers found related to the 
relationship between these variables. The relationship between disclosure of social responsibility de Sembiring 
(2005) found a positive relationship between the variables.  
The relationship between disclosure of social responsibility and independent commissioners shows different 
results. Sudana (2011) and Nurkhin (2010) found a positive relationship between these variables. While 
Cahyaningsih (2011), Kusumawardani (2017) found no relationship between these variables. The relationship 
between disclosure of social responsibility and institutional ownership shows different results. Cahyaningsih (2011) 
found a positive relationship between these variables. While Nurkhin (2010) found no relationship between these 
variables. Based on these researchers, the authors are interested in examining the relationship between disclosure 
of social responsibility and good corporate governance that is proportioned to the size of the board of 
commissioners, independent commissioners, and institutional ownership, and profitability and leverage. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Good Corporate Governance. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), corporate governance is a system used 
to direct and control the company's business activities. Corporate governance regulates the sharing of duties, rights 
and obligations of those concerned with the life of the company, including shareholders, boards, managers, and all 
stakeholders of non-shareholders, Sutojo (2008).  
Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI), GCG as a set of rules or systems that regulate and 
control the company to create value added for stakeholders related to the rights and obligations of interested parties, 
Ramdhaningsih (2013) .  
Good Corporate Governance (GCG), a pattern of relationships, systems, and processes used by corporate 
organs (Board of Directors, Board of Commissioners, GMS) to provide value added to shareholders in a 
sustainable manner over the long term, while taking into account the interests of other stakeholders, legislation 
and prevailing norms, Daniri (2014). 
 
2.2 Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure is one of the GCG mechanisms for controlling agency issues in companies. The 
mechanism of ownership structure is, among other things, the institutional ownership structure. Institutional 
ownership is a shareholding of a company owned by an agency (insurance company, bank, limited liability 
company, investment company, and other institutional ownership). Ownership of shares by institutions is 
considered sophisticated investors because they are investors who are not easily lied to the manager, Tarjo, 
Cahyaningsih (2011). With a significant amount of ownership it is able to monitor management so as to reduce 
agency problems. The greater the institutional ownership is expected to act as a prevention of fraud committed by 
management. This means institutional ownership can be a driving force for the disclosure of social responsibility, 
Machmud and Djakman, Cahyaningsih (2011). 
 
2.3 The Board of Commissioners 
The Board of Commissioners oversees the Board of Directors in performing its best duties for the benefit of the 
company and its shareholders, ensuring the company always carries out its social responsibilities, and monitors 
the effectiveness of the Company's implementation of GCG, Daniri (2014). The ideal qualifications of members 
of the Board of Commissioners are as follows: Trustworthy by shareholders; Have integrity and dedication; 
understand company management issues; Having sufficient knowledge in the business field of the company; 
Provide enough time to carry out their duties; Able to understand and care about the interests of shareholders and 
all stakeholders of the company; Be able to make decisions based on good reasoning; Have an education, 
professional experience, extensive relationships that benefit the company; Able to translate their knowledge and 
experience into solutions that can be implemented by the company, Daniri (2014). 
 
2.4 Independent Commissioner 
An independent commissioner is a party who has no affiliation relationship with other members of the Board of 
Commissioners and the Board of Directors, nor with any major shareholder of the company. The number of 
commissioners to be owned by the company is contained in POJK 33 and Decree of the Board of Directors of PT 
Bursa Efek Indonesia no. Kep-00001 / BEI / 01-2014 dated January 20, 2014 on Amendment to Regulation no. I-
A on Stock and Equity Securities Listing In addition to Shares Issued by Listed Company ("BEI Regulation No. 
I-A"), wherein a public company must have an Independent Commissioner of at least 30% of the total members 
of the Board of Commissioners.  
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2.5 Related Theories of Good Corporate Governance 
There are two theories related to corporate governance, namely stewardship theory and agency theory. Stewardship 
theory is built on philosophical assumptions about human nature that is in essence human beings can be trusted, 
able to act with full responsibility to have integrity and honesty to others. In other words, stewardship theory views 
management as trustworthy to act best for the public interest in general as well as shareholders in particular, Daniri 
(2014). 
Meanwhile, the agency theory developed by Michael Johnson, a professor of Harvard, considers that 
corporate management as an 'agent' for shareholders, will act with full awareness for his own interests, not as a 
wise and fair shareholder as assumed in the stewardship model. Contrary to stewardship theory, agency theory 
considers that management can not be trusted to act best for the benefit of the public in general and shareholders 
in particular. Thus, "manager could not be trusted to do their job - which of course is to maximize shareholder 
value" (Tricker), Daniri (2014).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency concept is a contract whereby principals hire agents to make 
contributions to their interests by providing some decision-making authority to agents. An agency perspective can 
be used as a reference for understanding GCG, Wawo (2010) Ramdhaningsih (2013). Solihin (2008), various 
thoughts on GCG evolve as well as reference to agency theory where corporate governance should be monitored 
and controlled to ensure that governance is conducted with compliance with applicable rules and regulations, 
Radhaningsih (2013). 
Profitability  
The manager of the company has two responsibilities, namely the responsibility for obtaining funds to finance the 
assets and liabilities to use the assets owned by the company in order to earn income. Profitability measures the 
rate of return on investment that has been made by the company, either by using the total assets owned by the 
company or by using funds derived from the owner (capital), Darminto (2015).  
Wiagustini (2010), Profitability is used to measure company's ability to gain profit or effectiveness related to 
management of company management. This ability can be calculated from the capital itself or all funds invested 
into the company. From this limitation we can know the amount of corporate profits obtained in a certain period 
and the amount of capital itself used as well as the value of the investment used to obtain the profit, Ramdhaningsih 
(2013).  
Leverage  
Company leverage describes a company's ability to meet its long-term obligations. The ratios used to measure this 
ability are debt to equity, debt to total assets, and time interest earned, Darminto (2015). Hidayat (2007), Leverage 
is a tool used to measure financing of company assets financed by creditors. The Company will be more motivated 
to disclose a wider corporate social responsibility if it has a high leverage ratio that aims to meet the creditor 
information needs, Sriayu (2013). 
Corporate Social Responsibility  
World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD), CSR is a commitment of the company to 
implement the ethics of keprilakuan and contribute to sustainable economic development, Solihin (2008) described 
Ramdhaningsih (2013). The definition of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is still nobody approved globally, 
because the definitions of CSR and CSR components may vary in other countries or regions, but CSR generally 
speaks the relationship between the company and the stakeholders in which there is value - the value of legal 
compliance, as well as respect for society and the environment, and the company's commitment to contribute to 
sustainable development. CSR is not only a company's charitable activities and is not limited only to compliance 
with the rule of law, Mardikanto (2014).  
Jamali D. and Rabbath M (2007), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is also a concept that has captured 
the world's attention and gained new resonance in the global economy, which is now the increasing interest of 
CSR in recent years that comes with globalization and international trade, which has been reflected in increasing 
business complexity and new demands to improve transparency and good corporate governance, Mardikanto 
(2014).  
Toward the end of 2010, precisely on November 1, 2010, ISO 26000 has been released about International 
Guidance for Social Responsibility. The release of ISO 26000 has awakened the parties, that social responsibility 
is not merely a corporate liability, but has become a responsibility of all of us, both private institutions and public 
institutions. Individuals or entities, profit-seeking organizations or those who call themselves non-profit, 
Mardikanto (2014).  
ISO 26000 defines social responsibility as the responsibility of the organization concerned with the impacts, 
decisions, and activities in the community and the environment, through transparent and ethical conduct that 
contributes to sustainable development, health and welfare; taking into account the expectations of stakeholders, 
is in accordance with applicable law and consistent with international behavior norms, and integrated throughout 
the organization and practiced in conjunction, Mardikanto (2014).  
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (2006), in the content of the analysis contained the theme of the disclosure 
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of social responsibility, which consists of economic, environmental, employment, human rights, community, 
product responsibility, Ramdhaningsih (2013). 
 
2.7 RESEARCH HYPOTESIS 
Based on some explanation above, it is formulated research hypothesis as follows:  
H1 : The size of the Board of Commissioners influences the disclosure of corporate social responsibility.  
H2 : Independent Commissioner influences the disclosure of corporate social responsibility. 
H3 : Institutional ownership affects the disclosure of corporate social responsibility.  
H4 : Profitability affects corporate social responsibility disclosure.  
H5 : Leverage affects corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Definition of Research Variables 
The size of the Board of Commissioners 
To measure the size of the board of commissioners in this study, consistent with Sembiring (2005) is the number 
of members of the board of commissioners.  
Independent Commissioner 
To measure the independent commissioners in this study, consistent with Nurkhin (2009), which is:  
Independent Commissioner = Total membership of Independent Board of Commissioners : Overall number of 
members of the board of commissioners  
Institutional Ownership 
To measure institutional ownership in this study, consistent with Cahyaningsih (2011), namely: Institutional 
ownership = Total institutional ownership : Total shares outstanding  
Profitability  
To measure profitability of this research is consistent with Yuliawati (2015) that is using return on equity ratio 
(ROE).  
Formula Return On Equity:  
ROE = Profit after tax : Total equity  
Leverage 
To measure the leverage of this research is consistent with Anggraini (2006) using debt to equity ratio (DER).  
Debt to equity ratio formula: Debt to equity = Total Debt : Total Equity  
Dependent Variables (Corporate Social Responsibility) 
In this study, the dependent variable is the disclosure of corporate social responsibility. The checklist is done by 
looking at the disclosure of corporate social responsibility in seven categories: environment, energy, health and 
safety of labor, other labor, products, community involvement, and general Hackston and Milne (1996). The seven 
categories are divided into 90 items of disclosure. Based on Bapepam regulation no. VIII.G.2 on the annual report 
and the suitability of the item to be applied in Indonesia, then the adjustment is then made. Twelve items were 
abolished because they were less suitable to apply to conditions in Indonesia so there were a total of 78 disclosure 
items. Seventy eight items are then re-adjusted with each industry sector so that the expected disclosure items of 
each sector vary, Sembiring (2005).  
The calculation to determine the score of the corporate social responsibility disclosure index is, each item is 
scored 1 if disclosed and score 0 if not disclosed, the calculation of the corporate social responsibility disclosure 
index level is measured by the ratio of total score obtained to the maximum score that can be obtained. The 
maximum score of each block is different according to the adjustment that has been done on each block, Utami 
(2010). The social responsibility index is formulated as follows.  
INDEX = n / k  
Information:  
n = number of disclosure scores obtained, and  
k = maximum number of scores (78).  
 
3.2 Data Collection Method 
Data collection method used in this research is documentation method. Documentation method is the process of 
obtaining documents by collecting and studying so that will be known the relationship between the characteristics 
of the company with what is observed in this study. The documents are annual reports on food and beverage 
manufacturing companies in the period 2014-2016 published by the Indonesia Stock Exchange.  
 
3.3 Population and Sample  
Population in this research is food and beverage company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) year 2014-
2016 which amounted to 19 company. Sample amounted to 17 companies. The number of research observations 
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during the period of research 2014-2016 is 51. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis Techniques  
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis  
Multiple linear regression analysis to know whether there is significant influence two or more independent variable 
to dependent variable, Sunyoto (2012). Multiple linear regression equation as follows:  
CSRD = α + β1UDK + β2KI + β3KINST + β4PRO + β5LEV + e … (1) 
Information:  
CSRD   =  CSR Disclosure  
α   =  Constants  
β1,2,3,4,5   =  Regression Coefficient  
e   =  Annoying Variables  
UDK   =  Size of Board of Commissioners  
KI   =  Independent Commissioner  
KINST   =  Institutional Ownership  
PRO   =  Profitability  
LEV   =  Leverage  
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Multiple linear regression analysis to determine whether there is a significant influence of two or more independent 
variables on the dependent variable, whether there is a positive or negative relationship, and to predict the value 
of the dependent variable if the value of the independent variable increases and decreases.  
Tabel 1: Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Coefficients Resulta 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .157 .113 1.389 .172
UDK .020 .011 .285 1.768 .084
KI .908 .378 .463 2.404 .020
K.INST -.218 .079 -.310 -2.768 .008
PRO -.082 .070 -.170 -1.177 .246
LEV -.018 .026 -.082 -.688 .495
 
a. Dependent Variable: CSR 
Here's the multiple linear regression:  
CSRD = 0.157 + 0.020UDK + 0.908KI - 0.218KINST - 0.082PRO - 0.018LEV  
1. Constant of 0.157 means that the variable size of the board of commissioners (UDK), independent commissioner 
(KI), institutional ownership (KINST), profitability (PRO), and leverage (LEV) are zero, then the CSRD disclosure 
variable is 0.157.  
2. Regression coefficient of board of commissioner size (UDK) equal to 0.020, it means that if other independent 
variable constant (fixed) and board size (UDK) increase one then CSRD disclosure variable increased by 0.020.  
3. Independent regression coefficient of independent commissioner (KI) equal to 0.908, it means that if other 
independent variables are constant (constant) and independent commissioner (KI) increases one then CSRD 
disclosure variables increased by 0.908.  
4. The regression coefficient of institutional ownership (KINST) is equal to -0.218, meaning that if other 
independent variables are constant (constant) and institutional ownership (KINST) increases one then CSRD 
disclosure variables will decrease by 0.218.  
5. The profitability regression coefficient (PRO) is -0.082, meaning that if other independent variables are constant 
(constant) and profitability (PRO) increases one then CSRD disclosure variables will decrease by 0.082.  
6. Leverage regression coefficient (LEV) equal to -0.018, meaning that if other independent variables constant 
(leverage) and leverage (LEV) increased one then CSRD disclosure variable (CSRD) will decrease by 0.018.  
Coefficient of Determination 
Test results concluded that R square is also called coefficient of determination. R square value is 0.451 (R square 
value is squaring of correlation coefficient (R), or 0.451 x 0.451 = 0.203). That is 20.3 percent. CSR Disclosure 
(CSRD) can be explained by the size of the board of commissioners (UDK), independent commissioners (KI), 
institutional ownership (KINST), profitability (PRO), and leverage (LEV). While the remaining 79.7 percent (100% 
- 20.3% = 79.7%) is explained by other causes or factors. R square value ranges from 0 to 1, the smaller the value 
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of R square, the weaker the relationship between the variables.  
Influence of Board of Commissioner's Size on CSR Disclosure 
The size variable of the board of commissioners (UDK) has a t value of 1.768 with a significance level of 0.084, 
which means that the value is greater than the 0.05 significant level, then the hypothesis is rejected. This means 
that the variable size of the board of commissioners has no effect on CSR disclosure. The results of this study do 
not succeed in supporting the agency theory, in which the board of commissioners is considered as the highest 
internal control mechanism, which is responsible for monitoring the actions of top management. Associated with 
corporate information disclosure most studies have shown a positive relationship between the various 
characteristics of the board of commissioners and the level of corporate disclosure, Sembiring (2005), who 
successfully supported agency theory, that the more the number of members of the board of commissioners in a 
company, the disclosure of responsibility corporate socialization will be wider, and in the opinion of Coller and 
Gregory (1999) who argue that the larger the number of members of the board of commissioners, the easier it will 
be to control the CEO and the monitoring will be more effective. Associated with CSR disclosure, then the pressure 
on management will also be greater to express it. Sembiring (2005) also supports the results of research by Arifin 
(2002) who found that the board of commissioners positively influences the wide range of voluntary disclosures 
made by companies in Indonesia.  
Influence of Independent Commissioner on CSR Disclosure 
Independent commissioner variable (KI) has a t value of 2.404 with a significant level of 0.020, which means that 
the value is smaller than the 0.05 significance level, then the hypothesis is accepted. This means that independent 
commissioner variables have a positive and significant impact on CSR disclosure.  
The results of this study are supported by Sudana (2011), which states that there is a significant positive influence 
on the disclosure of this social responsibility in accordance with the duty of the board of commissioners responsible 
for supervising the management of the company conducted by the directors. In addition, the position of 
independent board of commissioners in the company is representative of the community so that independent 
commissioners will support the company's activities in implementing corporate social responsibility that can 
improve the welfare of the community around the company and disclose it in the company's annual report. Agency 
theory states that the bigger a company then the agency costs that appear will also be greater. To reduce the agency 
costs, companies will tend to disclose broader information. Gray et al. (1995) Sudana (2011), large corporations 
have the ability to hire skilled employees, as well as the demands of shareholders and analysts, so that large 
companies have an incentive to disclose broader CSR information than small companies. The results of this study 
are also supported by Nurkhin (2010), that the independent board of commissioners owned by companies in 
Indonesia can perform their roles and functions. The existence of an independent board of commissioner can 
provide control and monitoring for management in the company's operations, including in the implementation and 
disclosure of social responsibility activities. The independent board of commissioners put pressure on management 
to carry out CSR activities and disclosure well. The results of this study are not supported by Cahyaningsih (2011), 
Kusumawardani (2017) research that independent board of commissioners can not influence the disclosure of 
social responsibility.  
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on CSR Disclosure 
The institutional ownership variable (KINST) has a t value of -2.768 with a significance level of 0.008, which 
means that the value is smaller than the 0.05 significance level, then the hypothesis is accepted. This means that 
institutional ownership variables have a negative and significant impact on CSR disclosure. This result is supported 
by Cahyaningsih (2011), that there may be indications that institutional investors have the power and experience 
to be responsible in applying the principles of corporate governance to protect the rights and interests of all 
shareholders, so they require management to communicate transparently by increasing the extent of CSR . But if 
institutional investors are less concerned with the implementation of corporate social responsibility, then they are 
less demanding management to increase the extent of CSR disclosure. In contrast to Nurkhin (2010), where 
institutional ownership variables have no effect on CSR disclosure. Effect of Profitability on CSR Disclosure The 
profitability variable (PRO) has a t value of -1.177 with a significance level of 0.246, which means that the value 
is greater than the 0.05 significance level, then the hypothesis is rejected. This means that profitability variables 
have no effect on CSR disclosure. The results of this study are supported by Sembiring (2005), stating that the 
possibility of research results in accordance with the opinion Kokubu et. al., (2001), which states that the political 
visibility of a company depends on size, not on profitability. Theoretically, Kokubu et. al (2001) there is a positive 
relationship between the economic performance of a company with the disclosure of social responsibility. This is 
attributed to the agency theory with the premise that greater profits will make the company disclose wider social 
information. Conversely, as stated by Donovan and Gibson (2000), in terms of the theory of legitimacy, 
profitability negatively affects the disclosure of corporate social responsibility. This is supported by the argument 
that when a company has a high level of profit, the company (management) assumes no need to report things that 
may disrupt information about the company's financial success. Conversely, when profitability levels are low, they 
expect report users to read the "good news" of the company's performance. The results of this study are not 
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supported by Nurkhin (2010), Sudana (2011), and Yuliawati (2015), that profitability has a significant positive 
effect on social responsibility.  
The Effect of Leverage on CSR Disclosure 
The leverage variable (LEV) has a t value of -0.688 with a significant level of 0.495, which means that the value 
is greater than the 0.05 significance level, then the hypothesis is rejected. This means that leverage variables have 
no effect on CSR disclosure. The results of this study are supported by Sembiring (2005), Anggraini (2006), 
Cahyaningsih (2011), Sudana (2011), and Yuliawati (2015), which states that leverage has a significant negative 
effect on CSR disclosure. Sudana (2011) argues that this is happening related to the relationship between creditors 
and debtors ie companies that have large debts or obligations tend not to carry out CSR activities because the 
creditor will further recommend the company to maximize the performance of the company in order to 
immediately pay off its debt or obligations to the creditor . The creditor assumes that CSR activities will hamper 
the company's ability to recover debts or liabilities, while companies with small debts or liabilities will carry out 
CSR activities to the communities surrounding the company. Supported by the opinion of Sembiring (2005), the 
company's reliance on debt in financing its operations is reflected in leverag levels e. This leverage also thereby 
reflects the level of corporate financial risk, based on agency theory, the level of leverage has a negative influence 
on the disclosure of social responsibility. Enterprise management with a high degree of leverage tends to reduce 
the disclosure of social responsibility it creates in order not to be in the spotlight of the debtholders.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
From the discussion that has been described in the previous chapter, it can be concluded as follows:  
The size of the board of commissioners has no effect on CSR disclosure in food and beverage companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange.  
Independent commissioners have a positive and significant impact on CSR disclosure in food and beverage 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.  
The institutional ownership has a negative and significant impact on CSR disclosure in food and beverage 
companies that are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.  
Profitability has no effect on CSR disclosure in food and beverage companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange.  
Leverage does not affect CSR disclosure in food and beverage companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
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